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Abstract
While information-theoretic security is often associated with the one-
time pad and quantum key distribution, noisy transport media leave room
for classical techniques and even covert operation. Transit times across the
public internet exhibit a degree of randomness, and cannot be determined
noiselessly by an eavesdropper. We demonstrate the use of these measure-
ments for information-theoretically secure communication over the public
internet.
1 Introduction
Throughout history claims have abounded of supposedly unbreakable codes and
ciphers, however it was not until the 20th century that the mathematical under-
pinnings of cryptology gave them any degree of credibility.
The first truly unbreakable cipher was the one-time-pad [1], invented in the
United States in 1918, but independently developed and first put into practice
by the German Foreign Office in the early 1920s. This scheme, however, is ham-
pered by the need to distribute a key to the message recipient of the same size as
the message and in perfect secrecy. This onerous key distribution arrangement
ruled it out for all but the most critical applications.
In recent years BB84, introduced by Bennett and Brassard [2], provides se-
curity by encoding data in one of two non-orthogonal bases, chosen at random
for each photon. The measurement basis is also chosen at random. After the
measurement has taken place, the two parties reveal their chosen bases and
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discard those bits that were not measured in the correct manner. As an eaves-
dropper does not know in advance which basis was used, she cannot reliably
copy its polarisation state and so any eavesdropping will manifest itself as an
increase in the bit-error rate (BER). This allows eavesdropping to be detected
by the two legitimate parties.
Later, Maurer [3] considered a more general case, letting the sender (‘Alice’
hereafter), recipient (Bob), and eavesdropper (Eve) each perform measurements
X, Y , and Z respectively. He demonstrated that secure information exchange
could occur (subject to some constraints) with an arbitrary joint distribution
PXY Z , reopening the door to information-theoretically secure communication
over a classical channel in some circumstances.
In 2004, Kish and Sethuraman proposed a classical protocol [4] based upon
commutative one-way encryption operators. If the sender and recipient each
apply a layer of encryption to a message, then commutativity allows the sender
to reverse her own operation and so produce a ciphertext with key known only
to the recipient. In order to overcome the information-theoretic limits given by
Maurer [3] we have attempted to relax the constraints of the protocol [4] by
using the random transit times of the internet as encryption operations—this
imperfect channel allows secure communication without resort to the one-time
pad.
2 Round-trip times as a source of randomness
The essence of key distribution is to provide two endpoints with a shared secret
that remains unknown to eavesdroppers. A subtle point is that the endpoints
need not generate a secret and share it themselves, but could instead obtain it
from elsewhere, provided an eavesdropper cannot do the same without error.
One such source of random data is the transit time between two internet-
connected terminals. If Alice and Bob rally information packets back and forth
via the internet, the time of each transit is a quantity common to the measure-
ments of both, but measurable only with the addition of noise from the return
trip (see Figure 1). An eavesdropper will suffer the same problem, however her
noise will differ from that of Alice and Bob. This difference prevents her from
taking advantage of the error correction performed by Alice and Bob during
the information reconciliation [5] (IR) phase of processing, which discards bits
likely to be incorrect, much like in the quantum protocol.
We propose to extract random bits from the round-trip times by finding
their median and declaring those times greater than the median to be a one,
and those less to be a zero. With only one bit per round-trip, we avoid the
problem that errors are more likely to fall into a adjacent quantisation bins and
so create correlations between bits.
While the distribution of round-trip times is actually quite skewed [6], we
attempt to illustrate the technique theoretically by assuming transit times to
be normally distributed and computing an upper limit on the key rate.
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Figure 1: Consecutive round-trip measurements, where Bob’s response to Alice
forms a request for another measurement. The transit time of this intermediate
transmission contributes to the measurements of Alice, Bob, and Eve, and so
provides a source of mutual information.
2.1 The mutual information rate between endpoints
Let us denote the three packet transit times from Figure 1 as T1, T2, and T3
respectively. Then, TA = T1+T2, TB = T2+T3. Suppose the three Ti ∼ N (0, 1).
Then, as the distribution (and so the channel) is symmetric, we may calculate
the bit error rate as
1− P [TB < 0|TA < 0] = 1− P [T2 + T3 < 0 | T1 + T2 < 0] (1)
= 1−
∫ +∞
−∞
2φ(t2)P [T3 < −t2 ∩ T1 < −t2] dt2 (2)
= 1−
∫ +∞
−∞
2φ(t2)Φ
2(−t2) dt2 (3)
= 1−
∫ 1
0
2u2 du (4)
=
1
3
, (5)
where φ(t) and Φ(t) are the probability density and cumulative probability
functions respectively of the normal distribution function. It should be noted
that the derivation above holds for any zero-median symmetric distribution
rather than just for the normal distribution.
This BER of 1/3 corresponds to a channel capacity of 0.08 bits/measurement,
suggesting that the achievable key rate with this technique may be too low for
direct use as a one-time pad.
2.2 Limitations
Despite the allure of information-theoretically secure key agreement without
specialised hardware, this method is not perfect and is necessarily dependent
on the eavesdropper’s inability to timestamp packets with perfect accuracy. This
limits its use where an eavesdropper can timestamp packets on the link directly.
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To illustrate this point, we make use of Maurer’s upper bound [3] on the secrecy
rate, the maximum rate at which information can be transmitted securely,
S(X;Y ||Z) ≤ I(X;Y ).
This states that the rate at which secure communication may take place is
limited to the mutual information of the two endpoints. The effect of this
statement is that a protocol, no matter how clever, cannot provide secrecy
using only independent random number generators at each end.
In order to demonstrate the relevance of this inequality, imagine that Eve
can timestamp Alice’s transmissions without error. Then, Alice cannot gain an
advantage over Eve, who has the same information as Alice, and so secrecy is
impossible.
Now imagine that we have placed a router between Alice and Bob. This
introduces some randomness, but Alice could achieve the same effect by simply
adding a random delay to her transmissions; that is to say, it is as though
she used a random unshared key. As discussed, this cannot form the basis for
a secure system. Therefore, if Eve can measure without noise, information-
theoretic security is not possible.
However, there are many cases in which this is not true. If an eavesdropper
simply has copies of all traffic forwarded to them (such as provided by port mir-
roring), then routing delays and packet reordering provide the necessary source
of noise [7]. If a standard PC is acting as a man-in-the-middle, uncertainty in
the timing routines of its operating system provide an additional source of noise.
These factors allow the system to provide security, especially against unsophis-
ticated eavesdroppers using only commodity network hardware that does not
provide hardware timestamping facilities.
3 Experimental Round-Trip Measurements
In order to demonstrate this technique, we constructed a test system to deter-
mine the performance of the method in the presence of an eavesdropper. The
test system rallied UDP packets back and forth along a chain of hosts (see Fig-
ure 2), with the time of each arrival being timestamped. While the timescales
were not synchronised, this information is sufficient to determine the various
round-trip times.
The effect of information reconciliation is shown in Figure 3. While the BER
of the eavesdropper falls at first, it soon reaches a minimum value of around
2%. This demonstrates that some nonzero secrecy rate is achievable via privacy
amplification.
4 Demonstration System
We have implemented the described protocol, which has been successfully op-
erated over the internet. Round-trip times are measured using UDP packets,
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Figure 2: The constructed communications link. Alice is located in Adelaide,
Australia, in the same room as Eve, to whom she is connected via the local
network. The packet is then forwarded to through a relay in Los Angeles, and
finally to Bob in Frankfurt. Alice sends a packet to Eve, who forwards it to Los
Angeles, and finally to Bob in Frankfurt. The packet is then returned. At each
step the arrival of the packet is timestamped, and the packet finally returned
to Alice contains a time of arrival for Bob, and two for each intermediate note.
The head of the chain in Adelaide, representing Alice, sends a packet which
is timestamped at each of the three other hosts. The demonstration system
described later does not transmit timestamps over the network, allowing each
node to determine only its own round-trip time.
whose times of transmission and receipt are determined using operating system
routines. If a timeout occurs, due to a dropped packet for instance, the trip
is marked as such and dropped during the reconciliation process. Information
reconciliation is performed using the bit-pair iteration [3] protocol, each end-
point executing identical code in lock-step (with the exception of a network
abstraction layer).
Parameters for the information reconciliation and privacy amplification are
determined automatically. A lower bound on eavesdropper BER is given as a
parameter, and so their channel capacity is computed and thus the amount of
information that they hold. From this, a hashing function is chosen—the sum
of some number of bits modulo two—that will discard sufficient information
to eliminate the eavesdropper’s knowledge of the secret key. As this process
will increase the BER of the legitimate parties also, the target BER for the
information reconciliation is reduced to compensate.
The BER of the channel is estimated using the error rate of the parity bits.
A 2σ Agresti-Coull [8] confidence interval is constructed and back-propagated
through the binomial probability mass function [9], yielding a confidence interval
for the BER of the underlying channel. Then, the BER of the parity-checked
output of each iteration can be computed recursively in order to determine an
interval containing the required number of IR iterations. When this interval
has been reduced to two possible values, we take the larger of the values and
continue with the complete reconciliation process.
We succeed in generating keys at a rate of 13 bits/minute over the link
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Figure 3: The effect of bit-pair iteration upon the BER between Alice/Bob and
Alice/Eve. This measurement used approximately 30,000 round-trips AU-US-
EU, with the eavesdropper chosen to be the node in the same room as the sender.
While the BER of the eavesdropper is improved slightly, it is not reduced to
zero, which is evidence that there is sufficient measurement noise to allow secure
communication.
shown in Figure 2, the lower bound on the eavesdropper BER set at 10−2,
based on the results shown in Figure 3. The 400 ms round-trip time makes
the test relatively pessimistic by terrestrial standards, and greater key rates are
potentially achievable across shorter distances.
5 Conclusion
We have considered the use of packet timing over the internet for information-
theoretically secure key agreement, and demonstrated the feasibility of the tech-
nique experimentally. We have developed a practical implementation of the
method that is capable of generating shared keys in real-time despite the as-
sumption of an eavesdropper BER equivalent to a man-in-the-middle attack
from within the local network.
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